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50 THE :MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
POST-WAR ECONOMIC PLANNING: POSSIBILITIES 
AND LIMITATIONS 
EMERSON P. SciIMIDT 
University of Minnesota 
Our primary job is to win the war; no consideration of, or pre-
occupation with, post-war planning should be allowed to interfere 
with this primary job. For this reason the following comment will 
be confined to suggestions which, if now followed, should help in 
the post-war period, yet interfere in no way with· the prosecution 
of the war; some of the suggestions should help the war effort. 
In the post-war world national boundaries and possibly national 
sovereignty will be substantially altered; whether an intensified eco-
nomic nationalism or greater international coordination of economic 
relations will ensue may depend upon how decisive the victory will 
be and who will be the victors. Elaborate plans are already under 
way for closer coordination of Canada and the United States, with . 
some high officials on both sides of the boundary looking forward 
to what may turn out to be almost complete economic integration 
of the two economies. Explorations involving other countries, es-
pecially western, are under way. Because of uncertainties on the 
international front the following discussion will be confined largely 
to domestic issues which need attention now. 
WHY PLAN? 
During World War I, little or nothing was heard of post-war 
planning. A survey published in April, 1942, by G. B. Galloway dis-
closed that over 100 public and private agencies are at present en-
gaged in some post-war planning or research. ·why are we now so 
anxious about post-war conditions? There are at least two signifi-
cant reasons, besides the fact that we are still conscious of the dis-
locations following the last world war. During this war we expect 
to devote over half our national income and resources to war.1 This 
will mean that about one out of ev-ery two people, or at least two 
out of every 5 people will be producing for war or engaging in war. 
Thus the problem of post-war readjustment will be enormous. After 
this war we will have to find jobs for 5 to IO million of the armed 
forces plus 15 to 25 million civilian workmen. Thus the magnitude 
of the task alone constitutes sufficient justification for some plan-
ning for that Demobilization day. 
A second significant reason for anxiety about post-war condi-
tions concerns the future of the private capitalist system. The last 
1 President Roosevelt in his budget message Jan., 1942, proposed a total expendi-
ture of $59 billions, 52 billions of which was for war purposes for fiscal 1943. Over 
$80 billions have been proposed for the following year. Germany is believed to be 
devoting about 70% of her national income and resources to war. 
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war was followed by revolutions and new economic systems in Eu-
rope. Unless we make the private enterprise system function ef-
fectively once this war is over, we foo may pass through a revolu-
tion, or into a revolution. If so, we may agree, years afterward, that 
we fought the war in vain. Blood, heads rolling in the sand, persecu-
tion and torture may be unavoidable then. Not pleasant thoughts, 
but we must be realistic. The entire world is undergoing a funda-
mental revolution, such as overtakes it only once in several cen-
turies. 
The post-war problems which we will have are traceable in part 
to industrialism and democracy. Under industrialism the bulk of 
the people have only their labor power to sell. If they make no sale 
they do not, eat- except by sufferance. Democracy has taught the 
individual his rights, his privileges - and not much about his duties. 
People have become enormously articulate and conscious of power 
politics for economic ends. 
The demand for economic security far exceeds the supply. Never 
again will mass unemployment be tolerated. Already people are say-
ing, "If we can create full employment and a higher standard of 
living by preparing for war or making war, we surely can spend 
public funds for peace time purposes." 2 
The historic function of the ·enterprise system has been the, 
gathering together of the factors of production: land, labor and 
capital, and organizing them into productive entities. So long as the 
employer performed this function fully and consistently he was not 
under serious attack. In the ·193o's for the first time in the United 
States his social usefulness was widely questioned. In the post-war 
world, unless full, steady employment is provided this usefulness 
will not only be questioned, but the survival of the private employer 
will be problematical. 
If the employer fails to provide employment, no government will 
be able to stay in power unless it takes over this function. The Am-
erican people do not like their government becoming employer, they 
are not socialistic. But if they are confronted with the choice: star-
vation or socialism, they will select socialism, or more probably 
some form of regimented society. 
That the state can do the entrepreneurs' job is not denied gen-
erally by economists; rather, quest_ion arises as to the degree of 
force which the state must adopt in order to carry out this function. 
When once the government is the chief or the only employer and 
owns most or all the instruments of production the issues at stake 
will probably be too great to be manageable by the democratic 
process. If we place upon government the responsibility of assuring 
jobs, incomes and a high standard of living that government must 
"Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, frequently reflecting the articulate and inarticulate long-
ings and strivings of the masses, said, "If we can afford a war we can afford a peace 
where people are not thrown out of 'work." Washington Post, Mar. 15, 1942. 
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have power and authority to act, to command, to dictate and to 
implement a policy with certainty and continuity, once it is 
adopted. Here we are confronted with the problem that perplexed 
Plato and many of his followers down to the present day: the recon-
ciliation of liberty and authority. · 
When the government takes over, the area and scope of liberty 
tend to shrink. In Europe the interventionist state has consistently 
driven roughshod over the liberties of the people - often in the 
name of the people. Huey Long is reported to have said that when 
fascism comes to America it will be done in the name of anti-fascism. 
That government entrepreneurship and liberty may not be con-
sistent with each other is suggested by a few recent experiences in 
the United States. The national government passed the Hatch A<:t, 
restricting substantially the liberties of public employees. One may 
ask legitimately, suppose we were all government employees would 
we all be deprived of our political liberties? When New York city 
took over the operation of the subways, :Mayor F. LaGuardia, with 
a long record of labor sympathy, announced that the right to strike 
and the closed shop will not be tolerated. vVhen the WPA workers 
went on strike, President Roosevelt said, "You cannot strike against 
the government." These are straws in the wind. But there are 
enough of them to justify us in raising the question whether liberty 
and freedom can survive if we shoulder upon the government the 
responsibility for our welfare, our jobs and incomes. 
There is a significant parallel in the developments of Europe and 
America. Progressive income taxes, old age pensions, workmen's 
compensation, unemployment compensation, youth movements, 
class struggle and finally revolution all came to one or more Euro-
pean countries about one generation before they came to America 
either in actuality or as a th1;eat. If this parallel continues we must 
expect in the United States a growing youth movement, intensifica-
tion of the class struggle and finally revolution. The pressure groups 
which we are developing in this country-virtually unabated dur-
ing our struggle with the Axis for survival - bodes ill for the sur-
vival of liberty in the post-war period. The pressure groups are not 
merely opposing each other but are manipulating the government in 
their favor. This probably must end in chaos. Why do they fight 
through the government? Because the government-not Wall 
Street or the employer-now determines their destiny. They know 
this and they propose to use the government for their own imme-
diate - not long-time- purposes. 
The problem of attaining full employment is severely accentu-
ated by monopoly, whether by business executive or labor union 
executive. Collective bargaining is intended to destroy the free play 
of market forces. Since it is a monopolistic technique for the deter-
mination of a price (wages) we should not expect that collective 
bargaining can normally lead to full employment, any more than 
we could expect all capital funds to find a market if all the lenders 
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collectively fixed the price at which they would loan money, unless 
they selected that price which would. enable all lenders to find 
borrowers. No one familiar with the character 'of the labor market 
and employment relations would deny that collective bargaining 
performs some useful purposes. lt is the abuse of the power gen-
erated by collective bargaining which leads to permanent unem-
ployment. "Abuse" here means ignoring the effect of the bargain on 
total job opportunities. It must not be assumed from the foregoing, 
however, that wage rates are the only factor determining the de-
mand for labor.8 
Some people view the foregoing comments with indifference. 
They say; "After all what we now have is merely an extension of 
·. governmental intervention which has been going on for a long time 
and this has not destroyed our liberties. Why get alarmed?" 
The answer to this complacency is obvious. First, in Europe 
where the state has reached deeply into the lives of the people, 
liberties., and rights of the people and protection of minorities have 
largely disappeared. Second, for the United States the new thing 
that came into the regulation of business after 1929 was the attempt 
to deal with the central problem of capitalism: depression and un-
employment. Previously regulation had been dealing with "inci-
dental abuses," monopolies, fair trade practices, evasions of law etc., 
and had always presupposed that the private enterprise system was 
sufficient to bring about relatively full employment and adequate 
production, in spite of regretable occasional and temporary lapses. 
Now, or after the war, the issue is or may not be incidental abuses, 
but job opportunities, full production, complete public control and 
operation. 
Thus (1) the magnitude of the post-war conversion taskand (2) 
the growing fear that the government in carrying out the respon-
sibilities which will be thrust upon it will destroy our liberties and 
freedom account for the substantial pre-occupation of many people, 
both in government and outside, with post-war planning. 
,VHA'l' IS PLANNING? 
Planning is the opposite of improvising. It assumes that what we 
have or will have results from actions previously taken. It assumes 
a certain cause-and-effect relationship in society which is subject to 
voluntary control. 
The assumption will be made that to some extent we can pre-
determine the character and scope of our tasks in the post-war 
period, and that by taking certain steps now during the war we can 
3 Nearly all planners and "public spenders" ignore or underestimate the problem 
outlined in this paragraph. A. II. Hansen & Guy Greer, The Federal Debt and the 
Future, in Harpers, April, 1942, p. 489, express bounding optimism in the possibility 
of creating full employment by public spending and never mention the above problem. 
The most extreme statement of this type is that of A. P. Lerner, The Economic Steer-
ing Wheel, University-Review, June, 1941, Kansas City, Mo. 
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ease the shock of post-war transition and encourage full employ-
ment. 
Space permits not much more than an enumeration of certain 
steps which might now be taken in the way of post-war planning 
and these steps will be divided into two groups: governmental and 
private. 
GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING 
Removal of Barriers to New Investment: There is a growing fear 
that America is a victim of secular stagnation, permanent depres-
sion and permanent mass unemployment, obscured, to be sure, by the 
defense and war boom for the time being. Prosperity and full em-
ployment absolutely require new investment. During the 1920's. 
new capital issues amounted to $5.7 billions annually. This created 
jobs, production and a high standard of living. During the 1930's 
this figure shrunk to $.82 billions annually, which meant stagnation, 
unemployment, and hardship. According to Carl Snyder an average 
investment of over $7,000 in plant and equipment is required to 
create one job in manufacturing. Clearly without new investment 
we cannot expect to provide job outlets for the 500,000 (net) young 
people entering the labor market annually. 
Except for the last decade, government in the United States 
has been motivated in its economic aspects by the ideas of investors, 
entreprenuers, innovators and expansionists. The rising standard of 
living of the masses was not the direct outcom~ of governmental 
efforts in behalf or at the behest of the masses; it was the result of 
the prosperity of business enterprise, which was compelled under 
the stress of competition rather than by government action ( except 
through anti-trust action) to share the fruits of progress with the 
entire population. 
Admittedly many abuses and excesses developed under this sys-
tem. The depression of the 1930's was due, in part, to these excesses. 
Certain reforms became overdue. The government in its zeal for re-
form, however, may have paralyzed the goose that laid the golden 
eggs. 
Some students attribute the stagnation of the 1930's to perman-
ent "maturity" and argue that the day of substantial private invest-
ment is done, great capital building is past and therefore the govern-
ment must take over the job of providing employment. An equally 
plausible- and to this writer a more plausible - explanation for 
our stagnation lies in the change of government attitudes and ob-
jectives especially with reference to the private inducement to in-
vest including especially taxation and labor policies. It is difficult 
to believe that America has suddenly shifted from a period of 
thumping prosperity and expansion to stagnation within a single 
decade due to any inherent "maturity." Rather the explanation 
should be sought in the shift of the institutional and political en-
vironment in which business operates. · 
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Between the pressure of increasing taxation, governmental red 
tape and controls, and the increased power of labor organizations, 
opportunities for profit- the mainspring of the enterprise system -
are and will be much more severely restricted than they have been 
in the past. A free flow of new investment does not require large 
profits if the risks are correspondingly low. But if the risks of loss 
are increased by political or other uncertainty, it is not easy to see 
how an adequate flow of private investment to pu~ men to work 
can be maintained. Profit is held out to the business man as a 
"bait." To carry out his function of putting men to work and pro-
ducing, the busine,ssman does not have to make a profit, he only has 
to expect to make one. Once he loses this expectation, he ceases to 
expand; then he loses his incentive to take either his own money or 
to borrow qther people's funds a.nd invest them in plant, equipment, 
raw materials, and pay roll. The result is stagnation - unemploy-
ment. 
In recent years the government has endeavoured to raise the in-
come and position of the masses by direct methods and to reduce 
the income of the wealthy- objectives worthy in themselves if in 
the process we do not all go down together. The surtaxes on large 
incomes and the failure to provide a system of averaging incomes 
for tax purposes destroyed most of the incentive for the groups with 
savings to invest in any but the safest securities. Discriminatory 
taxation on corporations cut heavily into another source of equity 
capital- so essential for starting new enterprises. At the same time, 
wage and labor policies were exerting and are apt to continue to 
exert steady upward pressure on costs. Perhaps even more impor-
tant than what has been done is the uncertainty as to what is ahead 
with respect to these points for the future. Business can adjust to 
many controls and restrictions but it can never adjust to extreme 
uncertainty. 
Thus in a period when lal:>ar supplies were redundant and em-
ployment opportunities were scarce, we have tried to correct the 
imbaJance by making the position of the employee more attractive 
and that of the employer more hazardous. We have forgotten the 
most simple definition of the employer-one who provides em-
ployment. 
Experience with getting war production under way in 1941 and 
1942 is giving the general public some realization of the crucial im--
portance of plant and equipment for doing the job; this is helping 
to rehabilitate the "employer" in the public mind and may facilitate 
the creation of an environment in which the employer can plan, 
make commitments and expand .after the war. 
Thus the removal of barriers to new investment and new em-
ployment opportunities constitute our primary post-war problem. 
Unless we solve this problem, all other efforts are likely to be rela-
tively feeble. · 
Flexible Policy of Taxation; Public Expenditures and Debt Con-
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trol: Conservative taxpayers generally have taken the attitude that 
public budgets should be balanced annually. However, there is 
nothing sacrosanct in the "year" 'for budgetary purposes. In de-
pression years governments may ,vell operate on unbalanced budg-
ets, providing that in good years they have the courage to over-
balance their budgets.·' In good years governments should not only 
live within their means but they should also pay off their debt or, 
if they have no debt, they might accumulate a surplus. Then when 
depression comes they should not levy additional taxes on their 
citizens (taxes tend to be deflationary) but by having previously 
put their financial houses in order, they should borrow additional 
funds to meet relief and other costs. 
Fortunately the federal government did this in part during the 
period after 1920. From a peak of about $24 billions the federal 
debt was reduced to under $16 billions in 1929. As a result of high 
credit the federal government could borrow at very low rates in the 
early 1930's to help finance relief and unemployment. However, 
many taxes were increased at the same time and these burdens off-
set the benefits of federal spending. Unfortunately the state and local 
governments failed to contract their debts in the 1920's and as a 
result their credit in the 1930's was low or destroyed and the federal 
government for the first time in our national history had to step in 
to provide relief. State debt increased by about 100% from 1922 
to 1929, during a prosperous period when it should have been re-
duced. 
At present (1942) the costs of state and local government are 
declining or could be made to decline without causing undue suffer-
ing. Now every township, village, town, county, city and state ought 
to cut useless services to the bone and use all surplus cash to get out 
of debt. Then when a post-war crash comes, these governmental 
units could face it with some equanimity, knowing that the pros-
pects for borrowing at low interest rates to put men to work would 
be good. 
Once a proper financial plan is instituted for liquidating debt or 
building up a surplus during active periods, the next step should be 
the planning of a public works, program. The president of a large 
Wisconsin factory recently outlined to the writer the type of plan-
ning which should be commenced promptly by every local and state 
government. He said that in the early 1930's when unemployment 
became common, the half dozen corporation presidents in the city 
held a ,meeting and after long discussion, each agreed to hire his 
clue proportion of the unemployed and give them a few days work 
each week. Out of this came nothing but headaches. The men were 
4 :Many planners an<l spenders go further and state that the federal budget does 
not need to be balanced even in the long run. This is based on the view that a public 
debt internally owned need he no burden on society, Alvin H. Hansen is a chief ex-
ponent of this veiw. 
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hastily selected; many misfits were hired and the experiment had 
to be dropped. 
Then and there they all decided that a more rational plan would 
have to be followed before the next depression. County planning 
had been in the discussion stage for some time. The president of the 
largest company was made chairman of a county planning commis-
sion. By 1939 the finances of the county were ·completely reor-
ganized, the county was out of debt, and the commission had set up 
a comprehensive system of public works, with complete identifica-
tion of priorities, from those subject to postponement for one year, 
others for two years, etc. With considerable satisfaction the presi-
dent said to the writer, "We think that when the next depression 
comes we will be able to find the funds to put all unemployed men 
to the production of needed public improvements and there will be 
no boondoggling." 
This is the kind of public works planning which should be com-
menced promptly by every public unit at every level of govern-
ment. If private citizens everywhere let their pu_blic men know that 
they expect this kind of planning we will have taken a worth while 
step in avoiding some of the evils of the post-war period. 
The National Resources Planning Board has prepared elaborate 
studies and blue prints and it is probable that when the time comes, 
the federal government will provide grants-in-aid for such projects 
to the states; the states in turn may niake grants to local govern-
mental units. But to make the program a success requires an en-
lightened citizenship and advance planning to avoid undue delays 
once the need for employment on public work arises." 
Postponing Manufacture of Consumer Durable Goods: It is 
sometimes forgotten that· we did not experience a depression 
promptly after the last war. This is attributed to the postponement 
of most public works, private housing and the buying of motor cars 
during the last war. Not until 1920 did we produce as many motor 
cars as we did in 1917. Thus there was an enormous "banked up" 
demand for cars once the war was over. To be sure, the fact that the 
automobile was a new gadget helped to bring the prosperity of the 
1920's. With it came the demand for highways, filling stations, etc., 
all calling for vast quantities of material and labor. 
Of necessity we are deferring the production and purchase of 
many durable consumers goods now. In 1942, it is estimated, that 
we will produce not over 20% as large a quantity as in 1940. Prob-
ably we are still producing too many houses, too much furniture and 
a number of other items and the government should receive full 
cooperation in its attempt to reduce durable consumer goods spend-
ing, not only because the labor and raw material must be devoted 
to war purposes, but also because all such deferment will create 
0 A.H. Hansen, After Defense What? National Resources Planning Board, 1941. 
See also the Board's numerous specific studies for excellent sug·g-estions. 
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prosperity after the war. The Celotex Corporation estimated re-
cently that there will be a potential market for 10 to 15 million new 
pre-fabricated family housing units in the immediate post-war 
period. The president of this company states that now the com-
pany has enough business to operate continuously on a seven day 
week and after the war the demand "will be several times as large," 
and new productive capacity will have to be created.6 
By refusing to allocate raw materials for consumer goods or pro-
hibiting their production or by levying prohibitive taxes on their 
pm;chase the government can go as far as it desires in implementing 
this idea. 
Closely allied with the foregoing is the tightening of consumer 
credit, especially installment credit. The government should be en-
couraged in this program and should go a step further in urging all 
lending agencies to consider it their obligation to avoid making 
loans which will finance buying of new consumer durable goods or 
bidding up prices. Consumer credit outstanding reached an all-time 
peak of $6.1 billions in August, 1941, and by the end of the year the 
figure. still stood at $5.6 billions. Installment accounts held by de-
partment stores on January 81, 1942, were 5% above the amount 
reported by identical stores for the same month in 1941. While the 
disappearance of most durable goods from stores will reduce install-
ment credit substantially in the near future, some damage to the 
price structure has already been done by over-buying. 
If the American people can not buy motor cars, refrigerators, 
new houses and other durable goods during the war, .it is quite 
probable that we may have a boom of tremendous proportions after 
the war. In fact, in some quarters serious post-war inflation is feared 
unless we continue some war-time controls after the war. Thus it 
may be more realistic to speak of a "post post-war" depression. 
Roughly we may expect one year of substantial prosperity for each 
year of total war with serious dislocation and depression in certain 
war-industry areas amidst the general boom. Even if this relatively 
optimistic picture is true we may still require careful planning to 
make the foregoing bear full fruit and to try to prevent a post 
post-war depression. 
Prevent Commodity, Land and Real Estate Price Boom: During 
and after the last war we had a tremendous inflation. Because we 
were nominally on the gold standard people did not regard it as 
inflation. Yet prices in 1920 were 150% above those in 1918. Wheat 
rose to $8.25 a bushel during the last war. Obviously, this raised the 
value of wheat land in the minds of farmers and they bid up prices 
of farm land with the help of lending agencies. Booms in prices of 
commodities, land, real estate, etc., should all be avoided. This will 
help to keep the dollar cost of the war lower and will help to obviate 
readjustment after the war when once the war demands and huge 
• New York Times, March 19, 1942. 
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war incomes are things of the past. If such mistakes are a voided this 
will constitute some sound planning for the post-war period. The 
Roosevelt Administration has been very skillful in suppressing 
things it did not want and could readily avoid land and other price 
inflation if it has the courage and will to do so. 
In 1942 the national income available for private spending, after 
allowing some $25 billions for taxes and war bonds purchases, will 
be about $80 billions while the goods available for purchase by con-
sumers will be only about $60 billions. The extra $20 billions will 
most certainly be used to bid up prices unless it is taxed away be-
fore it becomes purchasing power or a well administered system of 
extensive rationing and price ceilings is instituted. Inflation seems 
almost inevitable and if it comes will raise the money cost of the 
war substantially. This leads us to the problem of taxation during 
the war. 
Tax Policy: Taxes generally are deflationary. At present tax 
rates should be increased so long as they do not interfere with the 
war effort and do not force unreasonable readjustments in civilian 
lives. The greater the war burden that is financed with taxes instead 
of borrowing, the easier will it be to carry the financial burden of 
servicing the debt in the post-war period. Furthermore, we should · 
now plan a post-war tax structure which will stimulate, not burden 
industry. New investment in plant and equipment should not be 
penalized with taxes. 
Payroll taxes upon the employer should not be increased now, 
or at least should be minimized after the war so as to furnish an 
incentive for, instead of penalty, upon the hiring of labor. Payroll 
taxes are a tax upon the demand for labor. The more the employees, · 
the higher the taxes; the larger the payroll the higher the taxes. In 
a sense the payroll tax is the worst possible type of tax - it is more 
deflationary upon employment and the standard of living than a 
sales tax, contrary to popular impression. Only when a payroll tax 
serves some purpose besides raising revenue - such as reducing ac-
cidents in workmen's compensation m unemployment under experi-
ence rating in unemployment compensation laws, is it justified. Be-
cause such taxes levied during the war period may be difficult to 
abolish after the war, it is safer to avoid raising any additional 
revenue during the war from further increases in payroll taxes levied 
upon the employer. 
Excise taxes ultimately may yield $5 billion annually during the 
war; in the post-w~r period the mere repeal of these taxes when the 
government's need for revenue declines would constitute a stimu-
lating effect on business. Excise taxes, effecting everyone, will be 
easy to repeal after the war, while the same will not be true of pay-
roll taxes levied upon the employer. 
The proposed withholding tax under which .the government in 
effect would collect income taxes at the source merit consideration. 
Under the present income tax law the government has to wait until 
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Dec. 15th to collect the last installment on the previous year's in-
come tax. Suppose the war should terminate in the first half of some 
year. Tax payers under the present system of collection would be 
liable for the taxes on the previous year's income; but the war is 
over with certain deflationary tendencies confronting us. The tax 
payer might find his earnings drastically cut, because the war is over, 
yet he has last year's taxes to pay. A withholding tax by collecting 
the money as it is earned would obviate this, and would reduce the 
tendency toward inflation by withdrawing purchasing power at 
once. 
John M. Keynes, a noted British economist, early in the war 
urged the adoption of a system of taxes, part of which would be 
returned iil installments to the tax payer after the war. This was 
designed to make more palatable the taxing paying process and also 
help to maintain purchasing power after the war. As a device for 
reducing spendable funds in the hands of the consumer during the 
war and helping to finance the war effort, the proposal has merit. 
However, after the war when these tax payers claim their funds, 
the government will have either to tax its citizens to get the money 
or will have to sell new bonds to those able and willing to buy them. 
PRIVATE PLANNING 
The boundary between public and private planning for the post-
war period is not clear cut. The efforts of governments, individuals 
and corporations should be cooperative and united. 
Reduce Private Debt: Private persons including business estab-
lishments should make every effort to pay off debts, in order that 
debt retirement and interest payments once the war is over will in 
no way constitute a drain on private incomes. If surplus funds are 
available individuals might consider the pre-payment of insurance 
premiums; moneys invested in war bonds will not only help the war 
effort but may provide a cushion of spendable funds in· a post-war 
depression. 
Research for New Products: The bulk of private planning must 
rest on business enterprise. One essential line of approach is the 
immediate development of new products or new uses for old prod-
ucts or raw materials through research activities. When developed 
and tested they should be placed on the shelf for post-war exploita-
tion. By 1937, approximately 40% of du Pont's total sales were in 
products either unknown or not in production ten years earlier. The 
president of the Air Reduction Company (chemical) states, "A care-
ful estimate of our business indicates that forty per cent of the in-
crease in sales -during the past five years has been due to the de-
velopment of new products and to new uses for the Company's 
established products."• 
The fastest growing companies, chemistry for example, spend a 
'When the Defense Boom E11ds. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, N. Y., 1941. 
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much larger proportion of their gross receipts for research than do 
stagnant companies. American industry employs over 70,000 re" 
search workers in over 2,200 laboratories at an estimated annual 
cost of over three hundred million dollars. In many other businesses 
hundreds of men are devoting part or all their' time to improving 
their products or developing new uses for existing products. In 
many industries, trade associations are devoting time and money to 
developing and improving products. All these activities should be 
stepped up. 
Out of 181 manufacturers recently surveyed, the average com-
pany spent $2 on research for every $100 of sales. The· chemical in-
dustry was in the lead - spending about $3 on research for every 
$100 of sales. 
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, in the October, 
1941, issue of Fortu,ne said: 
"Every defense industry should have a research staff working on 
plans for producing peacetime goods. If any business outfit con-
cerned with war production has not already clone so, it is negligent-
a negligence that will become an economic crime if it continues. A 
conference should be held to take inventory of these plans and to lay 
out a catalogue of the products that will be ·available when the war 
ends. The catalogue should be matched against known needs of the 
country for reconstructions." · 
The system of priorities now in operation is forcing a diligent 
search for new materials. Out of this research will come new prod-
ucts and new uses for both the products and the raw materials. In 
fact, a fairly completely changed line of new products and services 
may emerge. Prefabricated houses, it is widely predicted, may re-
place in part the present method of piecemeal construction. The ex-
perience ·now being gained in prefabrication will come into its own 
after the war. This will call for readjustment and adaptation by 
hundreds of suppliers. 
,vhether or not there will be depression depends not upon what 
a few large manufacturers do, but upon what hundreds and thou-
sands of employers do now. 
An immediate beginning should be made. Where does one begin? 
The three indispensable steps seem to be as follows: 
1. Developing new products and new uses for both old products 
and for raw material. 
2. Market testing in restricted areas to discover the saleability of 
the product. 
3. Tooling up or setting up a pilot plant to determine production 
procedures and costs. 
Ideas for new products or new uses for old products do not come 
out of the sky. Every company should have a minimum of one per-
son whose responsibility is to be.come completely familiar with all 
the activities of research agencies that are concerned with the com-
pany's production. or with the raw materials that are used by the 
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company. This person should familiarize himself in so f~r as is 
practical with the research activities of other companies in the trade 
to discover the best opinion as to probable trends and new develop-
ments. 
In each case the new product should be one, so far as is practic-
able, that can be produced with the same machinery or at least the 
same type of machinery and with the same labor. Furthermore, it is 
beneficial if the same sales force can market the new product. In 
short, the research should be conducted along lines which will 
require a minimum of readjusting of company practices. However, 
the inquiry on research should not be restricted to this objective. 
The branching out on the part of du Pont's, Eastman Kodak, and a 
number of other concerns illustrates how once a fundamental pro-
gram of research is embarked upon, new avenues of production open 
up. Eastman Kodak, for example, although commonly associated in 
the public mind with cameras, produces such unrelated products as 
rayon, vitamin products, and a vast array of others. The du Pont 
researchers have frequently pointed out that this branching out 
into new lines was an inevitable outgrowth of the fundamental re-
search carried on-. 
Thus it would appea1: that in the development of new products 
and new uses for old products or new uses for raw materials, the1 
first requisite is a willingness to devote some time and resources to 
research. Once the requisite determination is made and the proce-
dures set up, it would appear that the results tend to flow from this 
effort. 
The technique for determining the marketability of new prod-
ucts has been highly perfected. It is no longer necessary to produce 
a product and immediately try to market it on a national scale. 
Rather, by careful investigations it is possible to discover typical 
consumer areas and test out the product under perfectly representa-
tive conditions to determine its saleability and to determine any 
weakness it may have. 
As a part of this fundamental research work a pilot plant for 
production on a small scale can be set up. Dr. L. H. Baekeland is 
credited with having made the following statement, "Make your 
mistakes on a small scale and your profits on a large scale." The pilot 
plant has been called the "half-way house of industry." Sometimes 
it is called the "semi-works plant." David Pierce has summarized 
the four functions of a pilot plant as follows: 
1. To study new processes or new types of equipment in or<ler to 
secure data for plant design. 
2. To study proposed variation in old processes in order to in-
crease yield or quality or to improve the design of equipment. 
3. To make sample batches of new products for introduction to 
the trade. · 
4. To manufacture for sale new or specialized pro<lucts for which 
the demand is not yet large enough to justify full-scale plant 
operation. 
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There is substantial literature and body of knowledge on the 
planning and construction of pilot plants. Every university doing 
extended research, many trade associations engaged in research, and 
all the larger manufacturing plants have had extended experience 
in planning and constructing such semi-works or half-way plants. 
'l'he trade associations, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
or the Department of Commerce at Washington, D. C., can put one 
in touch with either the plants that would be most useful, or can 
refer one to source material. 
What Some Companies Are Doing: Are American businessmen 
doing something more than talking or thinking about post-war em-
ployment problems? Are they developing, but putting on the shelf, 
new products? Apparently the larger the company the farther has 
the planning gone beyond the "think" stage, although small as well 
as large companies are active. 
The vice president of a small chemical company recently told the 
writer, 
"In our business we can foresee a great development in the field 
of plastics. This means an expansion of the manufacture of organic 
products. ,ve are therefore now reviewing our raw material situation 
and are spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to find better and 
cheaper methods for producing the raw materials which we will need. 
We realize that we may not be in position to build the plants to pro-
duce these raw materials during the present war emergency, but we 
hope to have our plans and processes completed, so that by the time 
construction materials become available, we will be ready to build 
plants, at a time when the materials of construction will be cheap 
and labor will be plentiful. This, of course, assumes that capital will 
be available for such construction, which may be a dangerous as-
sumption as long as a large percentage of profits is paid out in taxes. 
This point deserves special attention by economists and legislators." 
Again he said, 
"Under our Plastics Division program, all salesmen are being 
called in from their field positions to attend a series of sales meetings. 
At these meetings they will be instructed to call upon prepared lists 
of firms doing national advertising whose products could or should 
use plastic materials in their manufacture. These products and firms 
will include those that are not playing a part in the Defense Program 
but should be important after the emergency. The salesmen will be-
instructed to approach these firms with the understanding that no 
materials are available now but they will be invited to work with us 
in solving all of the design, engineering, and technical problems aris-
ing from the use of the new plastic materials so that when the emer-
gency is over, most of the preparatory work will have been com-
pleted." ' 
The director of research of tool cutting manufactory in describ-
ing his company practice said, 
"Anything which is to be placed on the market after the war 
should be marketed to a small extent now, in order to educate in-
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dustry as to its utility and to develop 1~anufacture to a stage where 
it becomes practical to produce without undue delay later."" 
An executive of Eastman Kodak states, 
"We are, partly by force of circumstances and partly deliberately, 
withholding from the market new models of apparatus, so that we 
shall have an accumulation of new goods to offer after the unlimited 
. " . emergency 1s over. 
One of the largest bus operators in the country says, 
"One of the things we are definitely laying aside as a program to 
be taken up during the next business recession is a complete terminal 
building program .. : . to maintain business during the next reces-
sion we hope at that time to be in a position to inaugurate and carry 
through a complete equipment modernization program." 
The president of a farm equipment and building manufacturing 
plant states, 
" ... We help farmers solve their building problems. We main-
tain a very large research department and expect to have new meth-
ods, new equipment, and some revolutionary changes in the whole 
farl1).ing set-up ready for after the war." · 
An executive of an oil products company made the following 
comment, 
"Our compan'y policy for a year past, and for such time into the 
future as circumstances may warra1it, is directed toward an intensifi-
cation of both technical and market research, but with the distinct 
understanding· that the results of both phases of this research are 
to be placed on file (until) new products and new needs become 
necessary to bolster operations." 
The president of an office supply manufacturing plant said, 
"The cornerstone of our planning is in the perpetuation of our 
research and engineering without curtailment al this time when we 
can sell all that we can manufacture. The temptation might be to 
cut down on this expense which is a relatively heavy one. Instead of 
that, we have pushed om research and engineering in the belief that 
once the national emergency is over it will be very essential to have 
new things to sell, and the new ideas which are being developed will 
be the basis of new models, better equipment, and better handling 
of office problems." 
The president of a food manufacturing establishment reports 
that all deferable maintainence and capital building is being post-
poned until the war emergency is over. 
Another company states, 
"Television is an infant industry and there appears little likeli-
hood that television receivers can be manufactureed ... until after 
the emergency .... Nevertheless, we are keeping television alive at 
8 For a pre-Pearl Harbor survey of activities along this line see: When the Defense 
Boom. End.~. Liberty Bank ol' Buffalo, N. Y. 
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very considerable expense by maintaining a regular program 
television should be an important new industry in the post-war 
period." 
The president of a rubber reclaiming company states, 
"I believe the greatest hope of cushioning the shock of a future 
depression is through spending part of current earnings in research. 
An additional reason for doing this is that research is a recognized 
charge against earnings, and since taxes can be figured at about 50% 
of earnings, in many instances you get your research at half price." 
05 
The foregoing quotations are just a few among hundreds that 
might be mentioned. They reflect a consciousness on the part of 
business men that without post-war planning now, serious difficul-
culties· might be encountered. No doubt since these statements were 
made many businesses find themselves confronted with shortages 
of men and materials. :Many have been forced to shift to war pro-
duction. In a sense this simplifies the post-war employment prob-
lem because so much demand for consumer goods will be deferred 
that the need for essentially new ideas and new products is less than 
it was before Pearl Harbor. 
Employment Cash Reserves: United Aircraft Corporation an-
nouncing nin<'-month sales of $203,435,000, also announced a sig-
nificant new deduction from them: a $4,000,000 reserve "for the 
transformation from defense production to a peacetime economy." 
United was the first all-aviation company to set up such a reserve. 
But it was preceded by Sperry Corp., also fat with defense orders, 
which set aside over $433,000 in the first half of 1941 for post-war 
"readjustments of facilities and personnel." 
United and Sperry were agreed on the need for a cushion, but 
they disagreed on a vital point: United included its $4,000,000 re-
serve in "cost of sales''. (i.e., deducted it before figuring taxes); 
Sperry pessimistically figured its taxes first. If the Treasury should 
rule in favor of United, these rainy-day fiscal policies may become 
much more popular.0 
The Hartford Electric Steel Corporation, a subsidiary of the 
Hartford Electric Light Company, has set up a fund to protect its 
,vorkers against the time when a decline in the demand for steel 
castings will cause lay-offs. Under this arrangement, the company 
will pay monthly into a fund an amount equal to 5 per cent of its 
sales in each period. This contribution by the company is to be 
added to cost of products sold as a necessary item of expense with 
adjustment of selling prices if required over and above the tax 
credit received by reason of the expenditure.10 
The ,v estinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company as-
sured its 78,000 employees February 11 of a ''.grubstake" in the 
post-war period when reconstruction might necessitate some lay-
• Time, Nov. 17, 1941, p. 80. 
10 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1,5, 19•11. 
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offs. Under the plan, Westinghouse will set aside an amount equal 
to one-half of 1 per cent of its pay roll each month.11 
Employment Policies: A midwestern meat packer, needing addi-
tional men, requested his personnel manager early in 1942 to con-
tact garages and automobile dealers where men were being laid off 
due to the stoppage of the sale of automobiles. These men were 
given packing house jobs on condition that they would sign an 
agreement to go back to their previous employer when new motor 
cars were again available and on condition that their current em-
ployer would sign an agreement to take them back when this was 
practical. This facilitates an orderly shift of labor power now during 
the emergency and should encourage a more rapid absorption of 
these men into their previously chosen line of work. . 
,vhen an employee of an eastern bank is drafted the bank gives 
preference to immediate members of the draftee's family in filling 
the vacancy on the theory that when the draftee returns to civilian 
life this practice will facilitate his reabsorption. 
A laundry operator thought he noticed that many families used 
his services for the first time when they had a funeral in the family. 
So he wrote to 25 families having funerals that week offering his 
services during the week with his compliments. Twenty-one became 
customers and 17 became regular customers. Just at this time two 
of his men were drafted by the army. He replaced them with two 
others and his original thought was to use his new business-getting 
technique to expand his business. On second thought he concluded 
that he would like to give the draftees their jobs back after the war 
and so would delay using his new technique until after the war 
when he would want to be able to offer the returned soldiers their 
jobs. 
These last three illustrations may appear to be trivial. Yet, they 
indicate the diversity of things which can be done and suggest that 
if a goodly number of employers begin to think about post-war em-
ployment in sufficient time, the transition may be somewhat facili-
tated. 
In appraising the post-war problem we must also recall that 
every state in the union has a system of unemployment compensa-
tion. Generally men in the armed forces have their rights "frozen" 
under these laws so that when discharged from the army and navy 
such of them who had built up rights to unemployment compensa-
tion will be eligible for varying sums up to $20 per week in some 
states and for varying numbers of weeks, with an average of per-
haps two or three months. Civilian employees in both war and non-
war industries are generally covered by these laws. 
Furthermore, unemployment compensation is financed under a 
system of differential pay roll taxes, the tax rate applying to any 
particular employer depending upon his own regularity of employ-
11 N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1942. See: E. D. Hawkins, Di.smwsal Compensation and 
the War Economy, Social Science Research Council, Washington, D. C., 1942. 
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ment. Thus in most of the states employers have this additional in-
centive to make a quick and effective shift from war time produc-
tion to peace time production once the war is over. The combined 
thinking, planning and action under this unemployment-prevention 
incentive should facilitate further the transition to peace time oper-
ations.1~ 
CONCLUSION 
Employment, unemployment, and production are social pheno-
mena. resulting not from discernable, invariable natural laws, but 
rather resulting from human decisions. Because of the growth of 
industrialism and the extreme dependence of the great bulk of the 
people upon employment opportunities for their standard of liv-
ing, these human decisions underlying our economy must be more 
carefully planned in the future than in the past. If we had a flexible 
price and wage system we might be able to make the transition to 
peace-time relatively-full employment with only individual initia-
tive. But because of the pressure groups, price and wage rigidities 
and the magnitude of the post-war conversion problem, we should 
be prepared to combine governmental and private efforts in making 
the transition. Just as the best defense is an offense, so the best 
part of post-war planning must be done now by following the sug-
gestions, if sound, made in this paper as well as others which may 
come to the mind of the reader. 
In the period 1914-1918 no one could forecast the nature of 
problems following the war. We are in a similar position with re-
spect to the problems to follow World war II. International rela-
tions following the war are a matter of guesswork. Nevertheless, 
their impact on domestic problems will be enormous; contrariwise, a 
strong productive post-war America will have a real contribution to 
make to the rebuilding of stable international relat.ions. Domestic 
and international policies require coordination, although in this pa-
per the former has been our concern . 
., ., ., 
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The author presents a general discussion of the effect of war 
upon the personality of youth with suggestions as to how it may be 
12 Unfortunately a fe,v important states, for example New York and Pennsylvania, 
have not incorporated this unemployment-prevention device in their state laws. See: 
Stabilization Experience Manual, American Legion Employment Stabilization Service, 
Minneapolis, for a significant collection of ways and means to regularize operations. 
